# Dartmouth RR R1---Open Source

# 1AC

## 1AC V5

### Miscalc Advantage---1AC

#### Contention one is MISCALCULATION:

#### Tensions between the US and China guarantee crisis instability BUT implementing an NFU offers hope in an otherwise tense relationship, allowing confidence building measures that resolve credibility concerns.

Zhao '23

Biden holding talks with China on nuclear arms control, a rare departure from their otherwise tense relationship the U S feels immense pressure to enhance its arsenal overturn the decadeslong trend of nuclear reduction and exacerbate arms racing in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing maintains no first use should be the foremost topic for any discussion China doubled down on this insistence Growing suspicion of U.S. intentions led to misinterpretation of U.S. policies Beijing suspects Washington may be inclined to issue nuclear threats in future conflicts emphasis on low-yield weapons fueled apprehension generates significant pressure to engage in arms racing NFU best ways to reduce misperception and escalation Government from both countries should take part in discussions to develop criteria for assessing whether operational postures align with NFU This is vital

#### Expansion of warfighting domains guarantees miscalculation.

Binnendijk '23

Tension between the U S and China take on danger of spiralling into conflict Taiwan China is impatient for reunification frequent displays of military might in S and E C s Japan the Philippines and Vietnam tensions have been amplified by modernisation Chinese are expanding missiles i s r space and counter-space attack sub The U S is responding with sub s and drone the dynamics increas likelihood of crises

#### Intermingling causes escalation.

Brown '21

firebreaks between conventional and nuclear forces are blurred entanglement risks exist with Chinese forces bases host conventional and nuclear brigades creating overlapping risks Conventional and nuclear rely on the same logistics weapons indistinguishable when deployed attacks against China’s comm s would cut off nuclear force Even if China’s networks were separate it would be challenging to distinguish authorities could conclude they no longer have a survivable deterrent tempting counterforce target if it failed China use its remaining forces and inflict substantial damage China would be faced with use-it-or-lose-it pressures exacerbated by the fog of war

#### That'll cause conventional conflict to escalate nuclearly---but adopting no-first-use builds a proactive safety net to avert Chinese use-it-or-lose-it.

Eveleth ‘23

If during a conventional conflict the PLA receives reports about incoming American missiles they might use it or lose it As evidenced by writings from Chinese strategies attacks by U S against c and c increases risk that conventional actions will be misinterpreted as preludes to a damage limiting strike on strategic systems To ease this the U S change rhetoric towards Chinese strategic capability by explicitly acknowledging mutual vulnerability. This supported by changes to U S nuclear policy reassure the P R C that the U S is not posturing to achieve nuclear primacy to avoid miscalculation

#### The plan establishes a clear firebreak between conventional and nuclear levels---stops miscalc from escalating.

Goswami ‘23

In a stability/instability paradox intervention wouldn’t lead from conventional to nuclear as the two are separated the paradox can create escalation controls provided robust firebreaks NFU becomes a firebreak which will give confidence to intervene fear of an uncontrolled escalation could be used by a state to base deterrence Taking steps that increase likelihood of escalation

#### That unlocks an arsenal of strike options the U.S. is too reluctant to use now, solving deterrence better.

Montgomery ‘22

With Washington unable to conduct a counterforce strike and Beijing unconcerned to use strategic forces the two could clash at the conventional level China might start a conflict under mutual vulnerability U S might be less restrained in how it fights US leaders place restrictions on planners Fearful of China in a corner, the U S could forgo striking targets on the mainland to avoid degrading Beijing’s strategic deterrent it could enhance deterrence and warfighting by enabling Washington to embrace operational concepts eschewed when escalation concerns loomed larger

#### Specifically, it enables long-range precision strikes on the Chinese mainland, which penetrates Chinese A2/AD BUT is otherwise considered too escalatory to deploy.

Dobbins ‘23

improvements in A2/AD may impair direct defence forward-operating US forces become vulnerable The erosion will push U S toward enhanced weapons to regain survivability and to strike Chinese capabilities on the mainland As forward-operating survivability declines, strike range must increase. US operational emphasis will shift to more escalatory responses and deterrence based on punishment in Taiwan U S could make the threat to use nuclear weapons however credibility will be lower in the future because of China’s sufficient survivable second-strike to defeat US through mobile missiles sub missiles, multiple re-entry vehicles and penetration aids the promising path for the U S is conventional precision strikes against the mainland U S could recover tech and geographic advantages reverse vulnerability of US assets to cyber attacks

#### The technology for upgraded strikes already exists---a change in doctrine is key.

Cote ‘22

There are measures U S could take to counter Chinese missiles and aircraft They rely on existing tech but need a new doctrine for exploiting it they would involv conventional strikes against targets ashore despite Chinese a s w US bombers armed with long range missiles operate against Chinese aircraft and missile and synergies when sub s and bombers are used as a team

#### Absent an NFU, U.S. miscalculation is guaranteed.

Logan '20

Escalation risks influenced by Beijing’s measures to increase survivability misinterpreted as an actual launch raising alert status dispersing road-mobile missiles conducting launches leaders, confronted with Chinese maneuvers indistinguishable from an actual launch would face tremendous pressures to act increasing strategic competition exacerbate dynamics U.S. rejected calls to acknowledge mutual vulnerability perceptual factors significantly increases escalation risks

#### U.S. accidents go nuclear.

Montoya '23

U S deployed missiles in concrete silos to protect from nuclear explosions the U S maintains launch under attack that permits missiles to be loosed after sensors detect an attack leaves the president to guess whether the warning messages received constitute an actual attack scant time for committing to a civilization nuclear war early-warning systems generat false alarms real risks of accidental war policy is not needed

#### The plan is reciprocal and sufficient.

Dunn ’20

Chinese repeatedly stated that a n f u would be the most important step the U S could take to reassure China Nor should a n f u be dismissed as rhetoric The intensity with which Chinese officials defend the impact on posture debates within establishment evidence that China’s n f u constrains its posture The very process of reaching agreement provide officials windows into thinking about nuc s

### Modernization Advantage---1AC

#### Contention two is MODERNIZATION:

#### China’s resilient second-strike capability means mutual vulnerability is an objective fact---status quo policies that suggest otherwise drive modernization.

Santoro '20

US members with vast experience in national security acknowledged mutual vulnerability Still, the Chinese expected the U S to make the pledge explained that they were working to enhance their strategic forces projecting confidence in survivability of their second-strike strategists cautioned if the U S attack China would retaliate with all it had Their targets would have to be population centers nuclear war could not be limited hence the need for a relationship based on vulnerability

#### Nuclear buildup is a response to US threats of disarming strikes.

Mastro '23

Chinese modernization is driven by maintaining a second-strike capability The U S has intensified missile defense serious threat to China’s counterattack capability China has focused on intercepting ICBMs missile defense at fixed sites China has not announced a long-range system China’s rocket force moved from silos to mobile launchers expanded MIRVs consistent with the need to reduce the impact of a first strike significant advancements in early warning contribute to China’s confidence in its second-strike

#### BUT acknowledging mutual vulnerability through an NFU solves.

Talmadge '19

China’s modernization appear oriented toward survivability in the face of U.S. counterforce capabilities China’s protestations of m d speak to this rationale concern is that m d could endow U S with a damage limitation capability that might tempt U S first strike the U S might use counterforce to wipe out China’s forces and use m d to mop up ragged retaliation China’s improvements through mobility of land and sea-based forces air-launched b m adoption of MIRVs SSBN program would strengthen its deterrent given that U S does not acknowledge a state of mutual vulnerability with China omission gives impression the U S might execute first strike

#### Otherwise, modernization drives Sino-Indo-Pak arms racing.

Das '23

China in Nuclear South Asia India is now seeking to match China However the entanglement of nuclear and conventional could be dangerous improvement in Indian nuclear forces will not go unnoticed by Pakistan will seek to respond China is responding to the U S India is responding to China’s And Pakistan is attempting to not lag behind India devolving political situation in Pakistan created new possibilities for nuclear weapons tussle for power could have implications Indian side government’s increasing ambivalence toward its n f u is a clear threat to nuclear stability

#### Goes nuclear.

Markey '22

China India and Pakistan nuclear capabilities threatens its less powerful rivals. The result cascading arms racing the risk that crises cross the nuclear threshold Sophisticated missile systems MIRV s raise challenges for crisis management India’s relations with China deteriorated border saw the most clashes in four decades India-China tensions are certain to influence their relationship The interconnected rivalries complicate the policy challenge the U S should address the capabilities that expose Southern Asia to a significant risk of nuclear war

### Plan---1AC

#### The United States should disallow nuclear first use towards the People’s Republic of China.

### Cooperation Advantage---1AC

#### Contention three is COOPERATION:

#### The plan’s signal, regardless of policy, is a crucial step toward the possibility of bilateral cooperation with China.

Zhao ’23

to reduce China’s fear of hostile U S US have to bear responsibility to come up with issues this admin can start to show it is willing to listen and engage in a way acceptable to China China is unwilling to discuss most issues related to nuc s except a small number of Chinese favored topics, like first-use it is time for US to engage China on those favored topics consider bilateral no-first-use making the gesture to engage like that without having to change American policy

#### Alternative proposals fail, dialogue over an NFU is key.

Kulacki ’21

A US n f u open door to US-China conversations on arms control China pressed US colleagues on question of n f u It It is an expression of intent a benchmark Without n f u the Chinese government is unlikely to engage in nuclear weapons issues at an official level US acceptance of vulnerability to Chinese nuclear retaliation would provide the basis for discussions Without mutual vulnerability there is no basis China would be forced to accept U S will negate China’s ability to retaliate combined with first use it signal the U S seeks to dominate China rather than treat it as an equal. China’s only response is to increase capability of nuclear forces

#### Specifically, the aff opens the door to North Korean denuclearization.

Binnendijk ’23

spy balloon riled up the American politic absence of way to build confidence between U S and China is dangerous we recommend direct talks on doctrines and worries These might include bilateral US-Chinese pledge not to use nuc s first against each other or allies In essence U S and China converge on view no Pacific dispute would justify crossing the threshold With such understanding U S and China turn joint attention to security in Pacific. Foremost is No Ko ’s reliance on nuc s U S and China should pursue denuclearization of Korea Crises may seed opportunity. While mood is hardly conducive to olive branches it is not too soon

#### Cooperation on North Korea works BUT requires the plan as a concession.

Kim '20

pressure was critical that influenced Kim to pursue diplomacy in 2017 But No Ko sanction evasion as well as relaxed Chinese will blunted effectiveness in past years the economic dimension would require cooperation with China would aim to impose targeted sanctions similar to 2017 Ultimately US goal would persuade China to convince Pyongyang risks of nuclear Korea are intolerable US-China competition will influence No Ko negotiations sanctions would be impossible without Chinese support China views No Ko through the lens of competition with U S China will preserve No Ko as a buffer unless U S makes a concession on issues important to China

#### Limiting sophistication halts nuclear overconfidence.

Warden ’19

U S goal should be encouraging No Korea to accept a force consistent with defensive utility As No Ko ’s capability increases in sophistication Kim will gain greater confidence it can execute nuclear strikes in conflict with U S while living to fight another day No Ko may be tempted to initiate provocations crises, or even war, thinking its nuclear capabilities allow it to favorably manage escalating

Terry '23

Pyongyang’s WMD have been rapidly evolving the past few months nuclear program is entering a new phase The risk that miscalculation could lead to a conflict is growing No Ko ’s pursuit of solid-fueled missiles provides a startling indication of aims Pyongyang appears to be making rapid progress No Ko will conduct more solid-fuel tests on larger missiles These include submarine s ICBM there are many indications Pyongyang will conduct its seventh nuclear test Kim has been lowering the threshold for use conditions under which it would launch a preemptive strike these included not only when a attack on the country is imminent but when leaders believes preparations may be underway for a nonnuclear strike Kim reserves the right to respond with nuclear weapons

#### Chinese approaches to nuclear weapons are distinct and divorced from other aspects of their foreign policy.

Bin '15

indigenous Chinese security paradigm emphasizes national security challenges instead of national security threat white papers issued identified China is faced with the superiority of the developed countries technical lagging regarded as a national security challenge Chinese nuclear projects aim merely to master new defense technologies but not deploy them Chinese approaches in nuclear policy are different from the U S Chinese do not believe nuclear weapons are usable China always wants to avoid keeping roles of nuclear and conventional separate allows China to maintain a small arsenal indigenous idea technical lagging would invite attacks based on experience China has had its preferred approach in disarmament since it acquired nuclear weapons China begun to exhibit more nuclear transparency Over the past two decades Chinese have become more active in nuclear nonproliferation Chinese have their special understandings on nuclear terms and have a special paradigm in nuclear issues differences between Chinese and U.S. nuclear thinking

#### The plan is credible.

Gerson '10

Skeptics of underestimate the audience costs incurred By making an NFU public violation would incentivize opposition vocal political op- ponents generate attention damaging the U S rep- utation states might calculate they could not trust the U S beliefs weaken confidence in commitments undermine U.S. long-term secu- rity coordinate its declaratory policy and actions with regard to alerting nuclear forces If alert status too high leadership might believe that NFU is a bluff

#### Empirics prove. Aff solves PLA rationale.

Brimelow '22

China US nuclear weapons Beijing trying to make it impossible for the US to be confident it can carry out a preemptive strike The US has called on China to join an arms-control agreement Beijing has shown no interest, pointing to the US's lack of a n f u

# 2AC

## Miscalc ADV

#### 1. Miscalc turns AND the aff solves.

Facini 10-27

US nuclear posture dwelled exclusively on US capability capability surges riski escalation through an overreliance on untested or provocative technologies stronger US strategy build mutual understanding and risk reduction before a crisis forces the U S to test their deterrence relationship more numerous strategic systems sit at the end of the escalation ladder promising annihilation perceived vulnerability foundation of stabilizing arms control

#### 2. First strike deterrence is impossible. China has assured retaliation through tech and subs.

Glaser '23

counterforce enhance deterrent during a conventional war, fundamental problem is feasibility preemptive U.S. attacks would not be effective enough to limit damage adversary could do more than enough to destroy the functioning society. China’s modernization increases in size and survivability ensure that Beijing has capability even following a full-scale U.S. counterforce attack critique not persuasive mobile missiles developments adversaries certainly field decoys stealthy missiles and counterspace equipment jammers Given China’s commitment U S should expect China to respond

#### That zeroes credibility. That’s Santoro AND

White '21

nuclear threats only deter China if they are credible in the face of China’s threat to retaliate Washington cannot credibly threaten to fight a nuclear war and risk nuclear attack on US cities to defend Taiwan Some argue threats credible because China’s retaliatory threats are not thanks to counter-retaliatory strikes But some Chinese warheads would survive And no president could be sure credibility is low

#### Turns the DA.

Gupta '22

importance of threatening nuclear weapons to deter attacks is not compelling conventional capabilities are more than adequate to respond to aggression and nuclear weapons the U.S. spend 750 billion possesses 2,100 fighters 967 choppers and over 900 air transports Nuclear weapons are viewed as excessive retaliating would be seen as disproportionate U.S. would be held responsible it is highly unlikely any president would order a nuclear launch there have been several instances of biological attacks not met with nuclear attacks

#### 4. Chinese world order is impossible.

Wyne '24

China unlikely to overtake the U S Economically difficult for yuan to develop into a global currency B R I mounting woes and pushback U S strengthening ties with Quad as well as A S e A N democracies are coalescing to contest China China on the brink of decline sustained slowdown shrinking ratio between working-age and elderly populations coronavirus and Ukraine intensified efforts to diversify away

#### 5. Nuclear deterrence is irrelevant for Taiwan.

Cunningham '15

Chinese analysts believe the stakes would not warrant the use of nuclear weapons by China They assume the stakes would be too low for the U S as well the U S would not want conflict with China on behalf of allies China would not use nuclear weapons against the Taiwanese people such a war would be large-scale and high-intensity conflict interlocutors did not believe China would threaten or use nuclear weapons without being threatened or attacked first

## Modernization ADV

### O/V---Modernization ADV---2AC

## Cooperation ADV

### O/V---Cooperation ADV---2AC

## T Subsets

### AT: No Countries---T NFU Policy---2AC

## JCS CP

### JCS CP---2AC

#### Should isn’t certain.

Second Circuit '99

should as something that ought to shall express what is mandatory should recommends its usual meaning

#### Should isn’t immediate.

Summers '94

should used to express condition propriety futurity what is probable

#### The counterplan looks like chaos.

Zhenming ‘16

the US has the most powerful capabilities as well as willing to use them but makes a fuss about China’s modernization. The dual criterion over NFU it will make sense to clarify ambiguous information necessary to make demonstration and provide transparent information Or else change of nuclear policy invite misperception suspicion by foreign countries major concerns n f u policy will have to make it sure for others that it is a carefully considered reliable and irreversible

#### 6. Biden says no---empirics.

Shabad '21

Top military leaders said they had recommended to Biden that the U.S. keep troops in Afghanistan Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in testimony that they had communicated that advice to the president.

### AT: CMR---JCS CP---2AC

#### DoD solves now.

DoD '22

RFPB being renewed Advisory Committee Act 20 members civilian to have knowledge of, policy Ten persons not employed in any agency

#### No CMR impact

Krebs '20

No president trampled on c m r like Trump repeatedly dragged forces into politics overruled decisions threatened to invoke Insurrection Act regular breaches of norms make little impression on public Americans driven by party affiliation

## K

### Framework---2AC

#### Using the nation as a frame of analysis is good.

Lake 7

Scholars can work from assumptions by providing a powerful explanation of phenomenon. State-centric theories assume states are the primary actors Theorists do not deny existence of other s The importance of nonstate and transnational activities are obvious the claim is that states especially great powers, are sufficiently important that any theory must place them at its core States possess national interest analysts can abstract from domestic politics and assume the state is unitary and in neorealist theories it is state survival Survival is understood as primordial states possess final authority over territories it is reasonable to treat states as unitary citizens are bound by policies enacted by governments this ability make[s] states unique in i r However active a[n] n g o it can only speak for its members and principles it cannot bind others Because their unique status as authoritative actors states are central more important actors than others, and units of analysis in international politics

## Advantage CP

### Advantage CP---2AC

## Filibuster CP

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### AT: Laundry List---Filibuster CP---2AC

#### C. Filibuster is crucial to their impacts.

Repass '21

fundamental principle of democracy is majority rule along with minority rights Pure majority rule gives tyranny of the majority The filibuster is a way to assure minority rights When the minority is left out anger and resentment is fostered reducing the possibility of comity between parties

## Japan DA

### Japan DA---2AC

#### 1. Aff outweighs the DA.

Kim '23

China is modernising its nuclear arsenal Beijing will question if the U S put its people under nuclear threat to defend making South Korea and Japan nervous incentivising their own nuclear options call for nuclear armament is high driven by fear of China’s nuclear capabilities grow increasing

#### 2. No prolif---economics, politics, structural factors, etc.

UCS '21

new analysis finds Japan would accept a n f u Japan is under the nuclear “umbrella Japan would still have that guarantee many worry Japan might withdraw from the N P T there is virtually no chance Japan would make that decision government has considered nuclear weapons and found it was not in thei interest Japanese public has a deep understanding and strong opposition

#### Err aff---studies.

Knox '21

Japan is extremely unlikely to develop nuclear weapons in response to a n f u Prior Japanese assessments concluded benefits were not worth the political, diplomatic, and economic costs overwhelming majority of Japanese want to abolish nuclear weapons conservative Japanese officials do not claim Japan would develop nuclear weapons Neither do they have the political agency to make it happen

* The threat of US nuclear retaliation would continue to deter nuclear attacks against Japan.

nuclear Japan should not prevent this step

#### 3. Extended deterrence is failing.

Mastro '23

In Japan the specter of Trump undermined Tokyo’s faith in extended deterrence Ukraine has done even more to drive the debate underway Japan’s 2022 N D S A2/AD) network

#### **There are structural issues.**

Bandow '23

So Ko and Japan are growing increasingly uncomfortable relying on extended deterrence Hence Yoon ’s interest in acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent allies’ diminishing faith in America’s willingness to commit to nuclear destruction over less‐​than‐​vital interests goes far deeper than the president extended deterrence looks dubious [C]onvincing people you might use nuclear weapons to defend an ally isn’t easy Promises to defend allies always will be less convincing once nukes started flying full‐​scale nuclear war could scarcely be avoided

#### BUT the aff solves.

Gomez ’18

the U S finds itself in a catch-22. It is impossible to make the umbrella credible due to reputational problems with nuclear use the umbrella is not the only deterrence to Japan and Korea c p s and b m d reduce the import of umbrella it is substitutable address the declining import of nuclear weapons as Korea and Japan develop conventional capabilities and BMD

#### 4. Perception is thumped AND second strike solves.

Johnson ‘22

the president he would consul allies that’s what we did we nuclear speed dating we talked to allies in NATO and Pacific, to get their perspective the document makes clear we have as a goal to move towards a sole purpose declaration with allies yellow

Tatsumi & Kennedy 22

U.S.-Japan alliance meet challenges of a

**DESCRIPTION OF CHALLENGES IN THE WORLD RIGHT NOW**

The globe has been consumed by a pandemic for over two years; the climate is changing, with far-reaching impacts for billions of people around the world; trade has expanded and with it, new areas of the economy have emerged, especially digital; the Cold War ended but new threats to liberal international norms have arisen. U.S.-Japan alliance cornerstone in the Indo-Pacific focus on defense pandemic and climate change human rights, and coop with other allies

**<<DOESN’T SAY THE ALLIANCE SOLVES ANY OF THESE THINGS, JUST THAT IT IS “FOCUSING” ON THESE THINGS>**

maritime security of oceans critical sea lanes global implications for international norms development of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum have been spurred by the U S and Japan

**<<JUST DESCRIBES TENSIONS IN THE INDO PACIFIC, NOT EXTERNAL IMPACTS>**

emerging dimensions especially economic security supply chains trade and investment renewed need for the alliance alliance facilitate coop with other partners

## Politics DA

#### 1. CTC never passes.

Kolhatkar '21

The bill offers benefits intended to address economic hardship . No Republicans voted for the legislation The bill includes provisions to give one-time, payments to individuals

#### That shields.

Winder '19

presidency power is centered in a single individual president overcomes legislative gridlock divided government, by taking control Unilateral action is faster than the congressional legislative process In taking unilateral action the president does not need to obtain agreement from or coordinate with others presidents have exerted their powers with unparalleled frequency unilaterally issue signing statements, executive orders, and directives

#### 4. Arms controls talks thump DAs but don’t solve the aff.

Gordon 11-1

Biden is preparing to hold discussion with China on nuclear-arms control meeting will focus on ways to reduce miscalculation discussion doesn’t signal formal negotiations Chinese leadership still preparing for competition The hope is this exchange might open up more substantive conversations

#### 5. Lawmakers forget and compartmentalize.

Everett ‘18

Congress struggles to focus on any issue for more than a few days Every time it seems the president zeroed in he moves on Congress can’t keep up hyperactive mind-set quickly divert attention After bout of gun control Congress moved on Before it was Dreamers

#### 7. Winners-win.

Kane 21

Dem s spread too thin by eschewing focusing on domestic issues momentum and p c is a muscle. The more you exercise the more you have. It is not finite if we do positive things we’ve got more clout to do even more

### AT: Aging Crisis---Politics DA---2AC

# 1AR

## Miscalc ADV

O/V---Miscalc ADV---1AR

## Modernization ADV

O/V---Modernization ADV---1AR

## North Korea Turn

Top

### Bioterror Defense---1AR

#### Nuclear war is existential---outweighs on scope.

Sarg 15

nuclear war loss of the atmosphere as a result of powerful tornadoes caused by the explosions a powerful antigravitational effect suc atmosphere into space the Earth will become a dead planet like Mars

#### It’s technologically impossible.

Fodor 20

Even if agents are theoretically possible the question remains tech biotech underestimates challenges in developing greater lethality than natural agents that viruses can be created using synthetic means is false biological systems exist as tradeoffs between competing effects changing transmission effects lethality incubation period immune system or survival outside pathogen require greater understanding than currently possessed

#### Indiscriminate existential bioterror would never occur.

Fodor 20

the production and distribution would need to be carried out by an org with capabilities and desire such groups do not exist in large numbers few ideologies interest in bring humanity to an end bioweapons have proven hard to control few agents have interest in a pathogen that kills indiscriminately

#### No one has existential bioweapons---we’d know.

Fodor 20

Even if all the supplies tech and expertise could be obtained without arousing suspicion to be shut down pathogen would need to be trialed in different environments such testing draw attention of authorities

New tech exists but no ev that Korea has the new tech AND no ev that whatever they have is existential.

#### Counter-tech solves.

Fodor 20

extinction require the failure of any biomedical response As people with access to a technique grows, so does people who use tech to do good. This includes detecting controlling and curing diseases emerging tech fight diseases including transmissible vaccines rational design and reverse vaccinology

## T

#### The US already has an NFU for non-nuclear states---our interp only adds 4 affs.

Perkovich and Vaddi '21

2018 NPR states the U S will no threaten nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states

## DA

#### Nuclear deterrence hinges on the credibility of the first-use threat. Assured retaliation means China knows they’ll never risk US annihilation. That’s White AND

Perkovich '22

inescapable paradox of deterrence because no adversary is worth the loss of land and population Claiming a willingness to undertake national murder-suicide is not credible

China knows their arsenal would survive which makes it impossible for sabre-rattling to be credible. Tech ensures retaliation:

#### A. MODERNIZATION. Mobile missiles, decoys, stealthy missiles, jammers, etc. ensure retaliation. That’s Glaser, Santoro, White, AND

Roberts '22

tech to blunt China’s retaliation does not exist. Beijing have a myriad of means to inflict damage nuclear weapons by non-ballistic missiles the U S is going to have mutual vulnerability, The U S cannot negate the strategic deterrents of major-power rivals

#### B. SUBs.

Torode '23

China’s six ballistic missile submarines operating “near-continuous” patrols Equipped with missile they can hit the U S information changed so rapidly improvements in logistics command and deterrence patrols allow them to threaten nuclear counterattack even if land-based systems are destroyed

#### C. MOBILE FORCES.

Milne '17

Most confirmed mutual vulnerability exists U.S. first-strike capabilities limited China has loaded warheads onto delivery vehicles and dispersed mobile forces mobile missiles Desert Storm implying capabilities against relocatable targets had not improved Chinese decoy and penetration risk of Chinese retaliation could not be driven down to zero

#### Aff solves:

Cunningham '15

Chinese analysts believe the stakes would not warrant the use of nuclear weapons by China They assume the stakes would be too low for the U S as well the U S would not want conflict with China on behalf of allies China would not use nuclear weapons against the Taiwanese people such a war would be large-scale and high- conflict interlocutors did not believe China would threaten or use nuclear weapons without being threatened or attacked first